Weapons Systems Eval Group: Report on '73 war

"Of all the significant contributions Weapons Systems Evaluation Group has made to Western Freedom, our support of "Oil Cheaper than Water" wargame rules is the most significant."

https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:John_H._Sides.JPG

This is a great document, and a must-read for any gamer interested in this war. While the data is not as complete as we - or they - would like, it certainly provides some grist for the gaming mill, and thoughts on how these armies fought - especially from the perspective of gear - by those who were there. While there is probably more information that is more recent, this report should be read as well, and taken with any further reading.

Plus, it is fun to read anything that was "Top Secret" from the CIA archives, right? 

Anyway, below are some of the salient points that I thought would be useful for OChTW and I hope they are useful to you. Of course, not as good as reading the document for yourself, but if you're in a hurry, I think I got nearly everything...


Electronic Warfare
- involved Active Jamming and passive exploitation of COMM links.
- Isrealis disadvantaged by being on the defensive at war start. Still jammed Arab COMMS and exploited intercepts whenever possible.
- Egyptian effort was extensive, including: active jamming, imitative COMM deception, interception that lead to strikes at Isreali emitters. Soviet-supplied direction-finding gear was accurate. Egyptians used landlines extensively to defeat Isreali EW efforts. They successfully jammed air support nets, tactical air and armor COMM links. During early stages of the war, they exploited Isreali errors in COMM security and operating instructions.
- Syrian not seperately reported upon.

APCs
M-113 has 1.5" FA, BTR60 .4", BMP .87"
M-113 has .50 cal, BTR has two MG, BMP 73mm SB cannon, SAGGER, MG.
Isrealis had 500 M-113, 4,000 WW2 halftracks "extremely vulnerable" to artillery.
Overall, Soviet APCs had more firepower, while M113 was better protected.

ATGMs
SAGGER has 26 sec flying time to 3,000m, penetrating 15" armor at oblique. 500m min range, no night sight, remote-firing capability [80m away] & periscope.
Arab Use:
- deployed by infantry with 8 missiles per launcher, 
- usually fired from prepared position on the ground.
- about 1/3 of firings were in "salvos" 
- Egyptians had "greatly increased" the AT weapons in their Infantry Units.
Isrealis had limited artillery and infantry available to counter this threat.
- study of tank losses had 8/11 SAGGER hits being kills, and 7-25% of all tank losses being due to the SAGGER, and 40% of catastrophic impacts on Isreali tanks were from SAGGER.

- as war continued, better combined arms w'Infantry and Artillery reduced threat.

- Tank counter-measured included: firing upon SAGGER gunner, evading, breaking LoS [e.g. hiding], and smoke.

Artillery

- Arabs substantially increased their artillery from 1967, while Isrealis decreased it.

- was effective to degrade the performance of infantry and armor.

Isrealis

- gun and ammo shortages resulted in weaker support, counter-battery effort, and increased tube wear.

- poor training of reservist FO's resulting in Units calling in and adjusting own fire.

- 33% of casualties were from artillery.

- tankers said 25% of tank hits were from artillery, and 6% of them destroyed tank.

- weaker counter-battery effort, Arabs learned they didn't have enough rounds available to shell them continuously.

- weak camo and deception effort, no dummy guns, ineffective effort.

- Isrealis feel had problem delivering large amounts of artillery fire.

Arabs

- placed massive concentrations on objectives to protect advancing forces.

- continuous artillery fire preceded main battle line, sustained until at 500m of obective.

- BUT, sometimes attacked with little / no artillery support.

- strong counterbattery effort, 20 minutes from Isreali artillery firing, caused 900/1100 casualties among Isreali artillery batteries.

- 18-gun batteries covered 400x500m area.

- mounted strong camo/deception/dummy guns effort to reduce counter-battery / air casualties, including setting off smoke/flashes to fool Isrealis into thinking they hit a real battery.

Night vistion & fighting

Arabs had night advantage [according to Kahalani].

M48 had active IR to 1000m, T-series to 800m.

Isrealis
Patton Tanks had good "speed, agility, reliability, human engineering and fire control, ammos storage capacity [>50% than T-tanks]" but no stabilization.
- shortcomings are vulnerabilities of ammo storage and hydraulic fluid ignition, high profile, MG stoppages, TC exposure to view battlefield
- training thorough and rigorous, across all positions.
- Gunner's goal is destruction of targets at ranges >3,000m!
- Doctrine calls for engagement at max range with main gun.
- Accuracy is stressed over rate of fire.
- from a full halt, first shot is in 9-15 seconds.
- Battlesight at 1,000m with HEAT, 
- fought at extended ranges, employed ambushes, fired from prepared defilade, and mobile defense doctrine.
- didn't have anti-personnel round, used HESH and HEP v. Infantry.
- resupply under fire difficult, so M-113s were employed to do so in combat zone.
- 40% of vehicles engaged over 2,000m, max range 4,700m in the Sinai and 3,500m in the Golan Heights. MGs used at short range v. Infantry.
- Flags, radios, flares, unit markings and panels were all used for self-identification.

Arabs
T-series tanks had limited barrel depression, making hull-down fire difficult, but were small low and well-armored with 8" of armor on Turret Front! 
- Crew space cramped, power train and fire control antiquated, ammo storage limited.

T-62
- in "simulated tank duals" of equal forces, 2x as many M60s lost as T-62s [!?]
- T62 has day/night periscope for use with infrared night source.
- Arabs failed to take advantage of greater range capability and lethality of its HVAP FSDS round.

- Gunnery and crew training _relatively_ ineffective in light of combat performance.
- rigid textbook use of Soviet battle drill, in columns of armor using guideline distances for release points of formations without regard to terrain or circumstances.
- Arab tanks fired on the move during mass attacks, using the short halt at 1800m.
- buttoned up hatches once engaged.
- premature dismounting of mech infantry slowed tanks to walking speed.

Syrians
Not cross-trained in tank positions, abandoned tanks quickly.
- mutual support tactics and movement by bounds seldom used.
- tanks not directly engaged "waited their turn" instead of providing a base of fire.
- Syrians often maneuvered to flanking positions when attacked and used terrain more effectively than Egyptians, including using defilade, rising to fire, moving back and to a new position to pop up.
- Often used defensive blocking positions and ambush roles and surprised Isrealis.

Egyptians
- hatches open during movement.
- Defending, Egyptians didn't seek out maneuvering onto flanks v. Isrealis, used terrain poorly.

Infantry & Special Forces
Isreali 
- paratroops acted as SF, were young well-trained regulars.
- mech infantry older, less well trained, reservists - performed poorly.
- many tank commanders asked for para support as a result.

Arabs
Egyptian rangers were carefully selected and highly trained, attacked Isreali rear areas, including ambushing armor with RPGs and SAGGERs. Also partial success ambushing an armor unit via helo movement. Isrealis destroyed Egyptian rangers that remained isolated behind the lines.

Syrian SF were both helo and commando. They had limited success capturing Mt. Hermon.

Interesting report! Something in there for everybody who wants to game this period, altho II didn't cover the air or naval war bits at all. 

Special Thanks to Steve over at "Sound Officer's Call" who found these on the internet.

Happy Gaming!